To be exact about it, the structural problem with a group buy is that the organiser typically holds both the money and the material, which means there is no point at which any participant has recourse. That is solvable, and it is solved by design rather than by trust.
A defensible group-buy structure has three properties: the material is tested before it is split, the test is paid for from the pool rather than by the organiser, and the split is documented with photographs and a per-participant record of lot, volume and date. If any participant can reconstruct what they received from the records, a later dispute is resolvable. If not, it is not.
Specifically, the consumer-protection question about a stablecoin transfer has a simple answer: you give up reversibility entirely. There is no chargeback, no acquirer, no dispute process. What you retain is the on-chain record, which proves that a transfer happened and to which address — useful for establishing that you paid, useless for getting the money back. That asymmetry is the whole risk profile.
The economics of pooled purchasing are not specific to this field, and the failure modes documented in the general literature on informal collective purchasing — organiser default, quality dispute without adjudication, and free-riding on testing costs — are exactly the ones that recur here.
The evidence you want is boring: the same result, from an independent laboratory, across more than one lot, over more than one year.